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THE TYRANNY OF MONEY
Edward J. McCaffery*
LUXURY FEVER: WHY MONEY FAILS TO SATISFY IN AN ERA OF
EXCESS. By Robert H. Frank. New York: The Free Press. 1999. Pp.

ix,

326. $25.

With the greater part of rich people, the chief enj oyment of riches con
sists in the parade of riches, which in their eye is never so complete as
when they appear to possess those decisive marks of opulence which no
body can possess but themselves.
-Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 1776
Great wealth cannot still hunger, but rather occasions more dearth; for
where rich people are, there things are always dear. Moreover, money
makes no man merry, but much rather pensive and full of sorrow.
-Martin Luther, Table Talk, LXXXII, 1569
Probably the greatest harm done by vast wealth is the harm that we of
moderate means do ourselves when we let the vices of envy and hatred
enter deep into our own natures.
-Theodore Roosevelt, Speech in Providence, Rhode Island,
August 23, 1902
I.

INTRODUCTION

The more things change, the more they stay the same.
A human activity almost as venerable as the accumulation and
opulent display of vast riches is the condemnation of the accumulation
and opulent display of vast riches. People have been busily engaged at
each for several millennia now. Both continue in full flower as
America races into the twenty-first century with its liberal capitalist
democracy ascendant around the world, its rich richer than ever, its
less-rich curiously lagging behind.1 Yet figuring out what, exactly, is
* Maurice Jones, Jr. Profassor of Law, University of Southern California Law School
and Visiting Professor of Law and Economics, California Institute of Technology. B.A.
1980, Yale; J.D. 1985, Harvard; M.A., 1994, Southern Cal. - Ed. I thank Scott Altman,
Marshall Cohen, Carl Cranor, David Dolinko, Dan Klerman, Matt Spitzer, Eric Talley, and
the participants in the Southern California Law & Philosophy Discussion Group for helpful
co=ents, and Negin Mirmirani and Tim Lan for excellent research assistance.

1. For just some of the recent books on point, see ROBERT E. GOODIN ET AL., THE
REAL WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM (1999); FRANK LEVY, THE NEW DOLLARS AND
DREAMS (1998); EDWARD WOLFF, TOP HEAVY: THE INCREASING INEQUALITY OF
WEALTH IN AMERICA, AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT (rev. ed. 1996).
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wrong with the excessive accumulation and opulent display of wealth,
on the one hand, and then deciding what if anything to do about it, on
the other, have been among the most troubling issues of social theory
and political economy - far harder to pin down than the intuitive
sense that something is, indeed, wrong.
In his interesting, important, thoughtful, if sometimes wandering,
repetitive, and maddening recent book, Luxury Fever, the
psychologically-minded economist Robert Frank of Cornell University
- coauthor, with Philip J. Cook, of the related Winner Take All
Society,2 another widely accessible and important book - ventures
into this familiar domain. Part economics, part social psychology, part
autobiography, part cognitive psychology or behavioral economics,
part game theory, part evolutionary biology, part tax policy, and part a
journalistic foray into the lifestyles of the rich and famous in fin-de
siecle America, Luxury Fever offers up both a view of the social
problems presented by luxurious living and a specific type of solution
to them. In short, Frank argues that much of our spending results
from a desire for relative status, leading us to want "positional goods";
since everyone else does likewise, we end up treading water with no
improvement in our subjective well-being or utility. We would all be
better off if we hopped off the treadmill and directed our limited
resources to nonpositional goods, including more savings, leisure, and
education, whose benefits endure. Frank argues that a progressive
consumption tax can help us all to escape in a "win-win" way from the
collective action problem of luxury fever.
His description and
prescription each deserve to be thought through and taken seriously.
Luxury Fever is a good, important book.
I happen to agree with much of what Frank has to say about both
the nature of the disease and its remedy, curiously enough involving
tax policy.3 Where I am skeptical is at the level of the whys - the pre
cise connection between sickness and cure. It strikes me that Frank
plays too fast and loose here, and that it somehow matters, a point on
which Frank himself would agree ("ideas matter," he writes) (p. 267).
It strikes me, in fact, that what is omitted from Frank's style of analysis
is, in the end, more important than what is included.

2. ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILIP J. COOK, THE WINNER TAKE ALL SOCIETY: WHY THE
FEW AT THE TOP GET So MUCH MORE THAN THE REsT OF Us (1995).
3. For some of my own work on point, see Edward J. McCaffery, The Missing Links in
Tax Reform, 2 CHAPMAN L. REV. 233, 246 (1999) [hereinafter McCaffery, Missing Links];
Edward J. McCaffery, The Political Liberal Case Against the Estate Tax, 23 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 281 (1994) [hereinafter McCaffery, Political Liberal Case]; Edward J. McCaffery, Real
Tax Reform: The Case for a Progressive Consumption Tax, BOSTON REV., Dec. 1999/Jan.
2000, at 46 [hereinafter McCaffery, Real Tax Reform]; Edward J. McCaffery, Tax Policy Un
der a Hybrid Income-Consumption Tax, 70 TEXAS L. REV. 1145 (1992) [hereinafter
McCaffery, Hybrid]; Edward J. McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation,
104 YALE LJ. 283 (1994) [hereinafter McCaffery, Uneasy Case].
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But let us back up and begin where Frank himself does - with a
portrait of the nation as an ailing patient.
II. SICKNESS
Look around, and something indeed seems wrong in contemporary
America.
The beginning parts of Luxury Fever set out the problem in some
times gory detail - our rich are richer than ever, and boy are they
flaunting it. As is perhaps to be expected, we learn about the author
himself indirectly - and sometimes quite directly - through his
choice of examples. Watches, household appliances (especially gas
grills), wines, fancy cars (more on these anon), and houses mansions, really - are the recurring motifs. In each case, the thing is
bigger, better, or faster - and always more expensive - than ever be
fore.
My personal favorite example - the one I have been telling
friends and students about - is the Patek Phillipe watch that sold out
its limited run of four for a minimum of 2.7 million dollars per watch
(p. 16). This, I suppose, is the item on the book's jacket cover. Since
you might as well learn about me through reading this Review, I can
honestly say that I had never heard of Patek Phillipe until I read
Frank's book, although I live in the shadows of Beverly Hills. I also
take a perhaps perverse pride - more on this anon, too - in never
having spent more than $20 on a watch. Truth be told, when my
$19.95 Casio runs out, I often don't bother to replace its battery, which
costs $5.00, because it's easier just to get a new watch. Perhaps this
decadent impatience means I have a luxury head cold.
Returning to the more general malady, what exactly the root cause
of luxury fever is, or what exactly the best description of it might be,
varies a bit in Frank's text. But the symptoms are clear enough. We
are spending too much, on too frivolous things, and accordingly - by
the zero sum logic that pervades most of the book - we are spending
too little on good things, such as providing public goods and capital for
our personal and collective present and futures. We are wasting our
time and money on positional goods rather than on gains that endure.
Now as at least in part an economist (I have a master's degree in
the dismal science), I am obliged to point out that even wasteful, con
spicuous consumption need not be a zero sum game. Perhaps the
ability to engage in luxurious spending is an important inducement to
greater productive activity in the first place. If the wealthy preeners
noticed by Adam Smith in the opening epigraph worked harder than
they otherwise would in order to be able to strut their stuff in public,
then the celebrated social pie would be larger on account of their per
haps perverse motivation and the socially granted opportunity to sate
it. But much of Frank's analysis is static or partial equilibrium in the
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economist's sense.4 In particular, Frank gives short shrift to the idea
that productivity might decrease under his ideal solution - a steeply
progressive consumption tax.
On this as on other points, I am certaiµ that many, probably most,
professional economists will find Frank a better journalist or psy
chologist than an economist, although he is indeed the latter. Much of
Luxury Fever reads like an amplification of various possible market
failures: externalities and public goods, primarily, but also signaling in
the presence of asymmetric information, and so on. Frank, as he does
in all of his work,5 enriches this standard homo economicus analysis
with some sense of "homo realisticus" (p. 248), namely that imper
fectly rational creature who suffers from various cognitive heuristics
and biases, as chronicled by behavioral economists and decision theo
rists such as Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky, and Richard Thaler.
But when it comes to pure economics analysis, Frank is often defen
sive (worrying about or dismissing what the "free marketeers," "liber
tarians," or the "perfectly rational" crowd might think) on the one
hand, and imprecise on the other. It's all well and good to go beyond
the narrow, rational actor model, of course, but cognitive decision
theory - for all of its ·powerful insights - is notoriously unsystematic
and underdeterrninative. Granted that we mere mortals overreact to
some things and underreact to others, but how can we tell which is
what?6 I doubt that Frank will assuage critics looking for any precise
and predictive model behind his polished popular prose.
To illustrate, Frank somewhat curiously calls the specific idea that
individuals will respond to incentives in the form of high tax rates on
consumption by working less "trickle down economics" (p. 226, pas
sim). But the idea that people respond to incentives is quite general in
all rational choice social theory, as Frank elsewhere acknowledges (p.
228). The economist James Mirrlees, for example, received a Nobel
Prize in large part for his work on optimal taxation. Mirrlees's analy-

4. Frank does note in passing that: "Chaos theorists speak fancifully about how a butter
fly's wings flapping in China might set off a chain of events th�t culminates in a hurricane in
the Caribbean," p. 222, and many of the economists he cites are indeed using general equi
librium models. No such model, however, seems to lie too close to the surface in the text.
5. In addition to Luxury Fever, see FRANK & COOK, supra note 2, as well as ROBERT H.
FRANK, CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND: HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND THE QUEST FOR STATUS
(1985), and ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE
EMOTIONS (1988).
6. This is a point I have tried to make in my own work. Another connection I have with
Frank is my own interest in cognitive psychology, which includes a project coauthored with
Kahneman. See Edward J. McCaffery et al., Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspectives on
Pain and Suffering Awards, 81 VA. L. REV. 1341 (1995) (with Daniel J. Kahneman and
Matthew L. Spitzer); Edward J. McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L. REV.
1861 (1994); Edward J. McCaffery, Why People Play Lotteries and Why it Matters, 1994 WIS.
L. REV. 71. For other treatments merging law and cognitive psychology, see generally
BEHAVIORAL LAw AND ECONOMICS (Cass Sunstein ed., 2000).
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sis falls far short of the pejorative lay idea of "trickle down" econom

ics, and ends up pointing towards declining tax rates on upper-income
earners, even and maybe especially in the name of progressivity or re
distribution.7
Frank's arguments against "trickle down" theorists, moreover, are
inconsistent. He argues that we will not respond to an economic in
centive against luxurious living by working any less (Chapter Fifteen),
and thus that we will save more (pp. 233-35), but if we do work less,
this will be good, too, because it is good for us to work less and spend
more time relaxing and with our families (pp. 241-42, passim)
lei
sure being a classic nonpositional good. Frank does not close the loop
by explaining how, if we all respond to a "steeply progressive" con
sumption tax by spending more time with our families, we would still
get the "trillions of dollars" in benefits from more savings (p. 250, pas
sim) , except possibly for stating in passing that we should count the
value of leisure time in the national income accounts (p. 242), as if
this, alone, would help buy brick and mortar for public goods.
It is also unclear what the exact psychological mechanism behind
luxury fever is. Frank generally writes as if we are all the same, gov
erned by inexorable laws of nature or the relentless pursuit of self
interest, narrowly defined. But we are not all the same. Why do some
of us have the fever and others not? And if all or even many of us are
inevitably inclined towards conspicuous consumption, why would such
people ever save anything at all? Those concerned with only their
relative status might work even harder under a steeply progressive
consumption tax, still spend every penny they get, and all that would
result is more stress and possibly more tax dollars - which may be a
good thing but it is not going to cure anyone's fever. (It's also not the
kind of "simple and painless" "win-win" solution that Frank has in
mind, as I consider in Part IV.) This is the maddening part of Frank's
book - he sometimes wanders, makes debaters' points ("simply"
seems to be his favorite word, as in "there is simply no reason . . . ") ,
and generally oversells his conclusions. To a man with a hammer, eve
rything looks like a nail. Any reader of Luxury Fever will sense early
on that Frank's view of human nature - as inexorably inclining us,
absent some collective coordination device, toward destructive con
spicuous consumptive competition - is a hammer indeed.
In any event, Frank finds that we work too hard, stress out too
much, and seem to be no happier than if we did not do these things
(Chapter Five). Our savings rate is dangerously low (Chapter Seven)
-

7. See J.A. Mirrlees, An Exploration of the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation, 38
REV. ECON. STUD. 175 {1971); see also A.B. ATKINSON, PuBLIC ECONOMICS IN ACTION:
THE BASIC INCOME/FLAT TAX PROPOSAL {1995). For a helpful explanation of the optimal
tax literature and an application to progressive income taxation, see Joseph Bankman &
Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Strnct11re: A New Look at Progressive Taxation,
75 CAL. L. REV. 1905 {1987).
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- it has actually fallen precipitously since Frank, using data from the
mid 1990s, sounded the alarm, although it is notoriously hard to meas
ure.8 Our spending on public goods of all sorts is also dangerously low
(Chapter Four); our schools, public health system, water, environ
ment, inner cities, and infrastructure are all woefully underfunded. If
we could just shift from the rat-race treadmill of "conspicuous con
sumption" to more important "inconspicuous" consumption (pp. 9092, passim) - more free time, more savings, more spending on public
goods - we would all be better off, probably in the increasingly fa
miliar magnitude of "trillions of dollars."
So something is indeed wrong. We are addicted to the high life, ir
resistibly tempted to keep up with (or, better, .to better) the Joneses,
for the quite precise reason that our relative status matters. This may
have something to do with our hard wiring - a law of the jungle thing.
Frank discusses evidence from evolutionary biologists about the col
lectively foolish behavior of peacocks (their feathers are too big) or
elks (antlers, this time) (pp. 149-51). Or it may be done for perfectly
rational, cognitive, and instrumental reasons - a "signaling" thing.
Frank discusses the need (?) of job interviewees to have the best suits
(pp. 139-40), and, far less persuasively, of CEOs to have the biggest
mansions. "In the current environment, Bill Gates needs a $100 mil
lion estate to signal that he is the captain among captains of industry"
(p. 160). Later, "[a]n American CEO needs a 15,000 square-foot man
sion only because others of his station in life have houses that large"
(p. 217). Apparently, size really does matter. ·
Presumably, my cheap watch aids me as an academic, as in signal
ing to my dean that I could use a raise, although it is worth noting that
Thorstein Veblen, whom we shall revisit below, thought that the
scholarly class was most likely to over-extend itself in conspicuous
consumption, in an attempt to keep up with the wealthier classes with
whom academics inevitably mingle.9 But Veblen was a notorious
grouch, and maybe I am just an obtuse academic. In any event, Frank
thinks that we end up doing things that are "smart" (or at least really
difficult to resist) "for one, but dumb for all" (Chapter Ten).

8. See, e.g., Daniel Larkins, Note on the Personal Savings Rate, 19 SURV. CURRENT
Bus., Feb. 1999, at 8.
9. See THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS 113-14 (B.W.
Huebsch ed., 1924):
In any modem community where there is no priestly monopoly of these [scholarly] occupa
tions, the people of scholarly pursuits are unavoidably thrown into contact with classes that
are pecuniarily their superiors. The high standard of pecuniary decency in force among
these superior classes is transfused among the scholarly classes with but little mitigation of its
rigour; and as a consequence there is no class of the community that spends a larger propor
tion of its substance in conspicuous waste than these.
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PRESCRIPTION

Having set out the problem, Frank poses a solution that will seem
alien to many readers but is quite close to my own heart and work use the tax system. Frank argues for a progressive consumption tax, a
fairly old idea in the academic literature. Frank credits Hobbes,
Hume, and others with the idea (pp. 212, 223). The more specific idea
of a "cash flow" expenditure or progressive consumption tax was per
haps best developed by the eminent British economist Nicolas Kaldor
(he of Kaldor-Hicks fame) in a 1955 text, although Kaldor himself was
never all that clear on the moral and political bases of the idea.10 In
this country, the Harvard Law professor William Andrews, one of my
teachers, most famously developed the idea in the legal literature in
the early 1970s.11 It was picked up in an influential Treasury Depart
ment study authored by David Bradford and others in the late 1970s,
and became the intellectual underpinning for the Nunn-Domenici
USA ("unlimited savings accounts") tax plan, put fonvard in Congress
in the 1990s.12
A progressive cash flow consumption tax is a wonderfully simple
idea. To understand it, start with the Haig-Simons definition of in
come, which holds, in simplified form, that Income equals Consump
tion plus Savings (I = C + S).13 This tells us no more and no less than
that sources equal uses or, even more basically, that all wealth is either
spent (C) or not (S). By rearranging the simple identity, we get the
key insight of a cash flow consumption tax:
C=I-S
That is, Consumption equals Income minus Savings. Add up your in
come, as we do each year on our dreaded 1040 forms, then subtract
your savings, and you are left with consumption - you spent that
which you made but did not save. To this base it is a simple matter as simple as in the case of an income tax - to apply progressive mar
ginal rates.
Frank sees a progressive consumption tax as a solution to the col
lective action problem posed by luxury fever. This is consistent with

10. See NICHOLAS KALDOR, AN EXPENDITURE TAX (1955); see also Nicholas Kaldor,
Comments to William D. Andrews, A Supplemental Personal Expenditure Tax, in WHAT
SHOULD BE TAXED, INCOME OR EXPENDITURE?, at 151 (Joseph A. Pechman ed., 1980).
11. See William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Case Flow Personal Income Tax,
87 HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1974) [hereinafter Andrews, Personal Income Tax]; William D.
Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 309 (1972) [here
inafter Andrews, Deductions].
12 See LAURENCE S. SEIDMAN, THE USA TAX (1997); see also DAVID F. BRADFORD
& U.S. TREASURY TAX POLICY STAFF, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM (1st ed.
1977).
13. See McCaffery, Hybrid, supra note 3, at 1149.
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either the view that excessive consumption is an arms-race type prob
lem (everybody is in a mad and counterproductive race to be the
brightest peacock) or with the idea, not necessarily connected, that
consumption decisions are interdependent (one person's choices affect
others), and thus that there are classic externalities involved. In either
case unilateral actions - "self help," as Frank calls them (Chapter
Twelve) - are limited or altogether unavailing.
While traditional economists at least since Thomas Schelling have
understood the game theoretic structure of arms race problems,14 they
are reluctant to invoke interdependent preferences, because these de
stroy the firm conclusions of general equilibrium theory.15 This is akin
to the need for welfare economics or rational choice theory to rule out
envy, for otherwise Paretian norms are unavailing.16 Frank's point
about the interconnectedness of preferences and feelings of self-worth
(language he does not use) is an important and valuable one to stress.
It provides an argument for consumption taxation not widely empha
sized in the mainly economics literature arguing for such a tax. It also
resonates with the social contractarian thought of Rawls, sounding in
the interconnectedness of individuals in a well ordered society and,
importantly, with the primary good of the "social bases of self
respect."17 This is not, however, Frank's lingua franca, as we shall see.
In recommending some form of consumption tax, Frank is clearly
in step with the times.18 But Frank also favors - and here he is clearly
out of step with the times - "a steeply progressive consumption tax," a
phrase he repeats many times over. Just how steep? Frank states that
the USA Tax, which had rates ranging up to 40%, was not steep
enough (p. 225). In a perhaps significant glitch, in the one place he
sets out a specific rate structure (p. 213), he produces a chart of "tax
rates on taxable consumption" that stops at a 70% marginal rate for
consumption between $500,000 and $999,999. But this wouldn't even
cover a single Patek Phillipe watch purchase. Bill Gates, with his
14. See generally THOMAS C. SCHELLING, ARMS AND INFLUENCE (1966); THOMAS C.
SCHELLING, STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960).
15. See ROBIN W. BOADWAY & NEIL BRUCE, WELFARE ECONOMICS 113 (1984) ("The
first theorem of welfare economics will generally fail in the presence of jointness of con
sumption"); Martin Shubik, Pecuniary Externalities: A Game Theoretic Analysis, 61 AM.
ECON. REV. 713 (1971).
16. See, e.g., Y. NG, WELFARE ECONOMICS 31-32 (1980); Geoffrey Brennan, Pareto De
sirable Redistribution: The Case of Malice and Envy, 2 J. PUB. ECON. 173 (1973); Guido
Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE LJ. 1211, 1216-18
(1991); Lawrence G. Sager, Pareto Superiority, Consent, and Justice, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV.
913, 917-18 (1980).
17. JOHN RAWLS, POLmCAL LIBERALISM (1993) [hereinafter RAWLS, POLffiCAL
LIBERALISM]; JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) [hereinafter RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE).
18. See, e.g., McCaffery, Missing Links, supra note 3; McCaffery, Real Tax Reform, su
pra note 3.
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45,000 square foot mansion, surely spends more than one million dol
lars a year - he has to, to show that he is the "captain among captains
of industry." Just how high would Frank's rates go?
There is not a lot of detail in Frank's discussion of taxes. This
might be just as well, given the public's distaste for reading anything
about taxes other than how to avoid them or why they are evil. And
Frank has certainly written a widely accessible book, for which he de
serves a great deal of credit. But one omission is particularly unfortu
nate. Frank does not mention the tax treatment of debt, except in
passing to say that borrowing is a transition issue (p. 224). But a post
paid consumption or expenditure tax must include debt in its base or
the game is over.
The reason is simple enough to see. If we allow people a deduc
tion for savings, as a cash-flow consumption tax such as Frank pro
poses would do, but then do not pick up borrowing within the tax
base, people can save on the one hand and borrow with the other.
The result is lots of consumption, no net savings - and no tax. This
situation obtains today because of the numerous exceptions for the
present taxation of savings under the so-called income tax. Chief
among these is the realization requirement, which holds that no tax
falls due until the ultimate sale or other disposition of an appreciating
asset.19 When the value of Bill Gates's Microsoft stock increased from
$50 to $100 billion dollars in a recent year, for example, Gates paid no
tax on that "mere appreciation." If Gates were to borrow against that
appreciation - presumably he can get pretty good credit card interest
rates - and consume away, he would still pay no tax. If he dies with
both appreciated assets and significant debt, his heirs can sell off the
stock, pay off the debt - and pay no tax.20 Such is the tax system our
great capitalist democracy has given itself.
It may still sound odd to include borrowing in the tax base. But
recall that there will be a deduction for savings, C = I - S, so borrowing
that leads to savings will trigger both an inclusion (as I) and a deduc
tion (as S), and thereby cancel out. On the other hand, borrowing to
finance present consumption will generate tax. This is what we should
want under a tax system that effects its levies on the basis of "private
preclusive use," as Andrews phrased the matter.21 It works just like a
sales tax - you pay sales tax, without any question, when you buy
goods using a credit card. Frank's proposal is, in essence, for a pro-

19. Andrews refers to Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), as the Achilles' heel of
the tax system. See Andrews, Personal Income Tax, supra note 11, at 1129·30; see also
McCaffery, Real Tax Reform, supra note 3.
20. See I.R.C. §1014 (1994) (stepped-up basis for assets acquired from a decedent).
21. See Andrews, Personal Income Tax, supra note 11, at 1155-57.
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gressive national sales tax, as I have independently called the idea in
my own work.22
There is a lot to be said for such a consistent, progressive consump
tion tax. One very large problem with the current tax system is its
incoherent and unprincipled blending of consumption and income tax
elements, which leads to the arbitrage operation I described above.
We save without paying tax under a consumption tax model (as within
tax-favored pension plans or IRAs, or via the realization require
ment); then we borrow and spend away under the income tax model,
which does not tax debt. This means that there can be consumption
without taxation - that the way things are is upside down compared
to where Frank, myself, and others would put them. This also means
that a consistent consumption tax will have a very important base
broadening effect, one that commentators on tax policy typically ig
nore. While the systematic deduction for savings will shrink the tax's
base, the systematic inclusion of debt-financed consumption will in
crease it. Combined with the fact that we need have no preferential
rates for capital gains under a consistent cash flow consumption tax, it
is far from clear that a "revenue neutral" conversion to a consumption
tax will mean any increase in the rate structure at all. I'll come back to
this idea later.
A final and related point that Frank, not a public finance or tax
theorist, fails to stress is how close the current system already is to a
consumption tax.23 Perhaps this is because Frank wants to emphasize,
at least at times, the "radical" aspect of his proposal (p. 223, passim).
To be fair, Frank's proposal is radical in today's political climate. But
its radicalism relates to the nature of Frank's arguments for it, and,
more so, to its rate structure. As a matter of, the tax base - of the
"what" of taxation, as opposed to the "how much" - we already
largely have a consumption tax. Since all income is either consumed
or saved, and we do not tax much savings as is, we are mostly taxing
spending: the luxuries that Frank describes are already being pur
chased with after-tax dollars. The two major differences between the
status quo and Frank's proposal would be higher tax rates and, again
ideally, the inclusion of debt-financed consumption.
A powerful argument for moving all the way towards a consump
tion tax is that life in the middle is precarious.24 The USA Tax plan,
for example, which did not feature "steeply" progressive rates, was not
a terribly radical idea: in a nutshell, you can get there by "simply" re
pealing the limits on tax-deductible IRA contributions (although you
must then include borrowing as income, as the USA plan tragically did

22 See, e.g., McCaffery, Missing Links, supra note 3, at 250-51.
See, e.g., McCaffery, Hybrid, supra note 3, at 1152-55.

23.

24. See generally id.; see also McCaffery, Real Tax Reform, supra note 3, at 47.
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not).25 Frank may be doing a disservice to the public political culture,
not well versed in tax policy by any means, by confusing the base and
rate issues, and making a consumption tax, per se, appear to be a radi
cal idea. But he is surely to be commended for adding to and broad
ening the popular understanding of a very important public policy
proposal.

IV.

DIAGNOSIS

Something is wrong with our wealthiest citizens flaunting the luxu
rious life, and all or at least many of us following in their shadows.
The tax system can be part of the solution to this thing. So far, so
good. But what, exactly, is it that's wrong? Consider four possibili
ties:
1. Luxury fever is immediately irrational or self-harming, in that it
does not even bring pleasure to the individual patient, so to
speak; it has the structure of an addiction. Moralists like
Luther, in the opening epigraph, clearly held this sentiment. If
true, curbing the fever is in everyone's interest, and so the solu
tion is, in welfarist terms, strictly Pareto superior. In the lan
guage of modern welfare theory, this is a subjective, ordinal,
but paternalistic argument.

2.

Luxury fever is individually rational in isolation, but irrational
in the aggregate - it is "smart for one, dumb for all," as Frank
repeatedly (but not consistently) puts it; the disease thus has
the structure of a prisoner's dilemma or arms race type prob
lem. This is because status - which matters, according to
Frank, for a variety of instrumental and material reasons, in
cluding health (pp. 140-45) - is a relative construct, leading us
to crave positional goods. Everyone wants the fastest car or the
most expensive watch, just because it is the fastest or the most
expensive. But the social race to obtain the fastest and the
most expensive positional goods is collectively foolish. Curbing
the fever is a matter of devising the correct collective coordina
tion device that will again be, in welfarist terms, Pareto supe
rior. This is classic subjective, ordinal welfarism without pater
nalism.

3.

Luxury fever can be enduringly rational on the individual level
- it really is good to be king - but is bad for the collective be
cause the losers' pain is worse than the winners' gains, and the
whole game leads to a loss in aggregate welfare. A collective
action solution that in part redistributes wealth is to be pre
ferred. But this can no longer be on Paretian grounds, as there

25. See SEIDMAN, supra note 12, at 31-32.
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are now "losers" in the realignment. It must rest rather on
straight utilitarian (or "Kaldor-Hicks") grounds, looking to
"the greater net balance of social well-being," as Rawls would
put it.26 This is subjective cardinal welfarism, a strand of theory
currently very much in vogue in the legal academy.27
4. Luxury fever is, well, just plain wrong, quite apart from (though
not indifferent to) its consequential effects. This is as a matter
of basic social justice and fairness, in the spirit of Kant or
Rawls. Such a social contractarian theory makes reference to
objective social values and our moral obligations to others. It
steps outside subjectivism alone.
Frank does not clearly separate the first three arguments. But he is
decisively, and consistently, in one of them. He is, in other words, a
thoroughgoing, subjective welfarist. It is Frank's clear desire to press
the second argument, though he sometimes slips into the third where I believe the argument better rests. But to my sensibilities, the
most glaring omission in Frank's analysis is that he never approaches
the fourth argument - the broader one incorporating objective moral
reasoning.
As best I can tell, the word "moral" appears only twice in Luxury
Fever (words such as "duty," "obligation," "justice," and "fairness" or
their cognates fare no better; "fairness," for example, is discussed only
briefly, referring to empirical studies assessing the effect of the percep
tion of fairness, not fairness itself, on individual behavior (p. 116)).
Frank first uses "moral" when he explains his general approach in the
book:
This diagnosis of why our current spending patterns are problematic sug
gests the possibility, at least in principle, of reducing the speed of the
consumption treadmill, thereby freeing up resources that can be put to
various uses that would make more of a difference in our lives. For now,
I will say only that this can be accomplished in a simple and painless way.

My case for change is purely pragmatic, one based on self-interest alone.

It rests not on the social critic's claim that luxury consumption is self
indulgent or decadent, but rather on detailed and persuasive scientific
evidence that if we adopt a simple change in the incentives we face, all of
us can expect to live longer, healthier, and more satisfying lives.

26. John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. PHIL. 515, 532 (1980).
27. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, .AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 1998; RICHARD
POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY(1999) [hereinafter POSNER,
PROBLEMATICS]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shaven, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient
than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1984) [hereinafter
Kaplow & Shavell, Redistributing Income]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shaven, Principles of
Fairness Versus Human Welfare: On the Evaluation of Legal Policy, Discussion Paper No.
277, Harvard Law School (Mar. 2000) <http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center>.
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Yet it would be a mistake not to acknowledge that the case for changing
our current consumption patterns entails a moral dimension as well. . . .
[p. 11-12; emphasis added]
One page later, however, Frank is backing off the "moral dimension,"
reiterating that his "aim is not to scold but to describe a striking set of
possibilities" (p. 13). With that, he is off, down a road that explores
the first three arguments, largely the second - trying to find a "simple
and painless" way to help "all of us" to "live longer, healthier, and
more satisfying lives." This culminates in a systemic solution that can
enable "luxury without apology" (Chapter Fourteen).
Now who, perchance, can argue with that? Frank indeed com
ments on why his "simple and painless" and Paretian solution has not
already happened;28 basically, he blames cognitive misunderstanding
and a bad political system (pp. 224-26). But for these problems, we
could arrive at the promised land of steeply progressive consumption
taxation, apparently without any "moral dimension" to the argument
at all.
So Frank leaves himself with some kind of subjective welfarist ar
gument, and he moves around, rather uneasily, among the three basic
possibilities. Early in Luxury Fever, Frank seems to be saying the first
- people work hard to obtain rather silly things, and it certainly
seems as if they would be happier if they could just jump off the
treadmill. Frank does not push this line of inquiry, although it does
recur. It is clearly not his major point; he backs off from it in the mid
dle chapters, where he is more often somewhere between the second
and third arguments.
Ironically, though, there is something to be said for this first point,
even in the nonconsequentialist terms I mean to press. Maybe too
much luxury is a bad thing, and a manifestation of this is that at least
the otherwise moral person who engages in excessive luxury for
whatever reason is left to feel pangs of guilt on this account. Luther
thought that "money makes no man merry, but rather pensive and full
of sorrow."29 Garry Wills describes Thomas Jefferson, perhaps
America's first great excessive consumer, as also being conflicted
about his own possibly tragic lack of thrift.30 Roberto Unger, a leading
advocate of restoring a richer, normative vision of human nature to
legal scholarship, argues that luxurious living alienates man from his
own true nature and his fellow man.31 The fabulous scale of human

28. Compare Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100
YALE L.J 1211 (1991).
29. See opening epigraph: MARTIN LUTHER, TABLE TALK 82 or LXXXII (William
Hazlitt trans., Fount Paperbacks 1995) (1569) (posthumous).
30. Garry Wills, Storm over Jefferson, N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS, Mar. 23, 2000, at 1618.
31. See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, PASSION: AN ESSAY ON PERSONALITY
(1984).
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wealth today certainly allows our best dressed peacocks to far outstrip
the rest of the flock in a way inconceivable to other species; one really
can end up all dressed up with nowhere to go, as the archetypal Kane
learned too late for his own subjective well being.
Frank also has a problem here, as elsewhere, with his tendency to
reduce human nature to universal essences. If biology leads all people
to compete for status - if we all have the fever - it is not clear that
anything can change us. But if, as certainly seems to be the case, only
some of us have the fever, why cannot Frank argue that those without
it are better off than those with it? This indeed seems to be one of the
points of his discussion of individual savings behavior (pp. 98-100);
spenders are penny-wise and pound-foolish on their own lights. The
possibility of individual myopia has led some scholars to suggest ex
plicitly paternalistic social savings policies.32 But Frank is, for all of his
wide reading and interdisciplinary range, a contemporary economist
and social scientist first and foremost. Like his fellow travelers, he
wants to stick with Paretian norms and to avoid paternalism at all
costs (p. 273, passim). He cannot reside happily in the domain of this
first argument, which holds that at least some people are behaving
foolishly on their own lights.
This leads Frank to the second argument, the collective action
problem - that we could all be happier if we stopped the insanity of
excessive conspicuous consumption, so to speak. This argument is
Frank's most original and important contribution to the public policy
debate. It is a nice and interesting insight, and it might well be true in
some cases and to some degree. But it does not seem all that tenable
as a global matter of practical or political reality. Does Frank really
believe that high spending Americans would be better off under a con
sumption tax with marginal rates ranging in excess of 70% ? Or that
they would find this solution "simple and painless"? If so, it would
"simply" be a case of convincing them of this reality. Read this book
and repent, ye self-interested fools of little faith!
Yet Frank clearly (or "simply") does mean to be saying this. Con
cluding his panegyric in favor of a steeply progressive consumption
tax, he writes:

The catch? There is none. The extraordinary beauty of the progressive
consumption tax is its ability to generate extra resources almost literally
out of thin air. It is a win-win move, even for the people on whom the
tax falls most heavily. [p. 224]
Frank returns to this theme again and again; the book ends with a sub
section entitled "money for nothing" (p. 279).

32 See, e.g., Deborah M. Weiss, Paternalistic Pension Policy, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 1275
(1991).
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Perhaps Frank really believes his own rhetoric. But it hardly
seems satisfactory as an all-encompassing view of human nature,
American society, or modern times. Unless we are saying that the rich
are spending too much as is under their own lights - the dreaded pa
ternalism point - it must be the case that they are only spending at
high levels because of relative status issues, which they cannot avoid
for biological or rational reasons - we are all peacocks or job-seekers,
in the end. Is this true? There are of course other reasons to spend 
most of which, absent an elaborate array of deductions, would be
taxed under Frank's steeply progressive consumption scheme.
Spending on private education, health, or security may not be con
spicuous or positional at all, but such spending, left unlimited, might
still be unfair. In any event, if all that some or most of us cared about
were relative status, why would things be any different under a steeply
progressive consumption tax? Isn't it possible that we would save
even less, and work even more, to hold true to our peacockian na
tures?
Frank never discusses in his rich book the fact that most rich
Americans are not like his consumption-obsessed paradigm at all.
Most millionaires seem to be frugal, and most elderly wealthy people
continue to save, not dissave as both standard economic theory and
Frank's "homo realisticus" model both suggest that they should. Ac
cording to the popular best seller, The Millionaire Next Door, 10% of
America's millionaires have never spent more than $47 for a watch
(there is hope for me yet); 50% have never spent more than $235, and
only 1 % have ever spent more than $15,000.33 Granted that there is a
self-selection involved - frugal people are more likely to become
millionaires in the first place - there is still obvious self-restraint
against the fever out there. Frank's only explanation of such frugality
and thrift, within his own terms, is that such people are constrained by
"social norms," a limited and unsatisfying placeholder for some sense
of moral convention or propriety. I'll revisit social norms below.
As for my own humble scholarly self, I do not personally think that
my simple, inexpensive watch is a signal of my unconcern with mate
rial pleasures, or a biological attempt to find a mate with similar values
so that we can perpetuate a more Kantian species. Truth be told, I
would find it unconscionable personally to spend thousands, let alone
millions, on a watch, and I don't much care what my fellow persons
think. If I had such millions (I don't), I would want to save them, or
give them to charity; I certainly would not want to wear them on my
wrist. I think I am autonomous in this thinking; maybe I am deceiving
myself. But we can all at least hope - or pretend - that I am not.

33. See THOMAS J. STANLEY & WILLIAM D. DANKO, THE MILLIONAIRE NEXT DOOR:
THE SURPRISING SECRETS OF AMERICA'S WEALTHY 32 (1996).
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The fact that many of us are savers does not argue against a pro
gressive consumption tax: far from it. That such a tax is consonant
with basic American values makes it more, not less, likely to succeed.34
It does, however, change the argument structure. Since excessive lux
ury spending is no longer an unavoidable fact of nature, we can argue
against it in moral and/or redistributive terms, as Frank does not.
More generally, live by the sword, die by the sword. If the empiri
cal evidence for Frank's claims under this second argument founder and these are very stringent empirical claims indeed, given the insis
tence on at least a near unanimity condition that the Pareto (or win
win) principle requires - so do his claims themselves. Early on in the
book Frank presents evidence that money, at least above a certain
level, does not buy happiness (Chapter Five). Now I think there is
room to quibble with these studies; some people, such as the Japanese
in one study Frank cites, seem to say that they are always moderately
happy, which is not such a bad state of mind to carry through life's vi
cissitudes (or at least to tell a surveyor). But granted that such meas
ures of subjective well-being capture the status quo, what if the num
bers change? What if
as I suspect is increasingly true in America
since the Reagan Revolution helped to legitimate greed and lessen the
-

guilt of the good life - people really start becoming happier by
spending more on themselves? Or what if we could make them hap
pier, not by a "steeply progressive consumption tax," but rather by the
"simple and painless" step of convincing Americans to overcome their
puritanical opposition to luxuries, along with all notions of envy and
guilt? Would that justify "luxury without apology"?
Another problem with Frank's second argument circles back to an
omitted aspect of the tax discussion. Frank makes a common mistake
in thinking that a move to a consumption tax must decrease consump
tion and increase savings. It need not. The form of the tax system is
neutral as to the aggregate level of capital savings.35 I personally be
lieve that we can and should have a consistent consumption tax be
cause it would lead to a better, fairer, more sensible version of what
we have now. A progressive consumption tax would get wealthy peo
ple consuming out of capital to pay some tax, and would give all the
rich a choice of how to serve the public good - through ostensibly
private savings that add to the common capital stock, or through the
progressive taxes levied on their choice of lifestyle.36 But the corre-

34. This argument is central in Edward J. McCaffery, Tax's Empire, 85 GEO. L. REV. 71,
106·07 (1996) [hereinafter McCaffery, Tax's Empire]; see also McCaffery, Uneasy Case, su
pra note 3, at 345.
35. See Edward J. McCaffery, Being the Best We Can Be (A Reply to My Critics), 51
TAX L. REV. 615 (1996) [hereinafter McCaffery, Being the Best].
36. Note that by allowing a deduction for charities, we could give the rich their choice.
See McCaffery, Uneasy Case, supra note 3, at 257-58.
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sponding higher revenue from a more inclusive tax base, higher rates
on big spenders, and lower costs of capital, could be used "simply" to
lower taxes on middle class consumption.
In other words, a consistent and progressive consumption tax could
get and allow the rich to save, and then stop trying to get the middle
classes to do so. Much of current tax policy has been obsessed with a
targeted and probably futile attempt to do just the opposite.37 There is
much to be said for both the fairness and the efficiency of allowing
those with the most to save save, and leaving the rest of us, many of
whom live from paycheck to paycheck, alone. But if Frank's picture
of human nature is correct, this use of a steeply progressive consump
tion tax move would only free up the middle classes to get on, or speed
up, their own consumption treadmills. Veblen was well aware that this
could happen - that luxury fever has its analogs among the lower
economic classes.38 But such greater spending by the middle classes
would in turn push those up the ladder to fret that they must compete
more. This would certainly make them feel unhappy - thanks, but no
thanks - with Frank's "painless and simple" plan to make us all bet
ter off.
A steeply progressive consumption tax that self-consciously aimed
to reduce present consumption, or to shift work into leisure, in con
trast, will have redistributive effects across generations and among
people with different preferences. It will fall on spending on nonposi
tional as well as on positional goods, though the motive for the former,
by definition, cannot revolve around a concern for relative status. It is
not a "painless and simple,'' "win-win" kind of deal, and I sense that
Frank has done a disservice in the midst of his generally noble public
service by overselling this point. Not everything is a nail, after all,
even to a man with an especially elegant hammer.
This all leads to the third argument - that a progressive consump
tion tax is justified on classical utilitarian grounds, redistribution and
all. Frank is extremely tentative in endorsing this view, and does not
really flatly come out and say it. He sometimes makes a nod, as Rich
ard Posner does, to quasi-Paretianism, weakening the unanimity con
dition.39 But he wants to pull up short, to stick to this we-would-all-be
better-off line, implausible as it may seem. It is also more than a little
sad that Frank feels he must argue this way.

37. See McCaffery, Reai Tax Reform, supra note 3, at 47.
38. VEBLEN, supra note 9, at 36.
39. POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 27.
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v. ARE WE ALL HETERONOMOUS Now?
Ultimately, Frank's book rather unwittingly illustrates what I take
to be the single greatest challenge to normative social and legal theory
as it is practiced in law schools and elsewhere. I suspect that the most
common criticisms of Luxury Fever will come . from economics sorts
frustrated with the absence of more formal analytic rigor, a point that
Frank repeatedly anticipates and that I touched on in Part II. But I
am more troubled by the virtually complete absence of explicit moral
theorizing, a point that Frank all but ignores.
A book on the topic of luxurious living could "simply" not have
been written at any time in recorded history until the last few years
without some discussion of moral theory. F,rank repeatedly credits
Adam Smith, quite properly, with beginning the line of inquiry. Smith
was certainly sensitive to the moral dimensions of the story; he was a
professor of moral philosophy, after all, most proud of his own Theory
of Moral Sentiments, who infused the far more widely cited Wealth of
Nations with ethical concerns. Amartya Sen ha� complained about the
reductionist reading of Smith, stripping this rich thinker of his moral
dimensions:
[I] t is precisely the narrowing of the broad Smithian view of human be
ings, in modem economies, that can be seen as one of the major deficien
cies of contemporary economic theory. This impoverishment is closely
related to the distancing of economics from ethics.40

With Sen's view in mind, it is especially troubling not only that Frank
repeatedly reduces Smith to a prophet of self-interest (p. 171), but also
that he should give Charles Darwin pride of place over Smith among
"the only two men" from whom "our modem understanding of com
petition derives almost entirely": "Smith's view was by far the more
optimistic, but Darwin's more hard-edged analysis holds the key to
understanding our current situation" (p. 146). Apparently we persist
perilously close to the ethical awareness of peacocks.
Darwin influenced Thorstein Veblen, the most important precur
sor to Frank's effort - although he only receives a passing mention in
the text (p. 14). This is unfortunate, for Veblen is a subtle and inter
esting thinker who deserves more study today. He wrote widely in
criticism of economists and on the connections among religion, cul
ture, morals and competitive economic systems.41 Consider his analy
sis of "waste," both the term and the concept, in The Theory of the

40. A.MARTYA SEN, ON Ennes & ECONOMICS 28 {1987).
41. See generally A VEBLEN TREASURY: FROM LEISURE CLASS TO WAR, PEACE, AND
CAPITALISM {Rick Tilman ed., 1993).
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that the conspicuous consumption

Throughout the entire evolution of conspicuous expenditure, whether of
goods or of services or of human life, runs the obvious implication that in
order to effectually mend the consumer's good fame it must be an ex
penditure of superfluities. In order to be reputable it must be wasteful.43
Interestingly, Frank is never prepared to go this far; he does not gen
erally question whether there is some detached, objective benefit to a
luxury good. Veblen simply asserts that positional goods at the upper
reaches must be wasteful.
Veblen, however, has a problem here. Like Frank, Veblen is
clearly trying to be a classical social scientist. He wants to avoid ques
tioning individual rationality. Veblen thus notes a problem with the
moralistic flavor to the word "waste":

The use of the term "waste" is in one respect unfortunate. As used in the
speech of everyday life the word carries an undertone of deprecation . . .
It is here called "waste" because this expenditure does not serve human
life or human well-being on the whole, not because it is waste or misdi
rection of effort or expenditure as viewed from the standpoint of the in
dividual consumer who chooses it. If he chooses it, that disposes of the
question of its relative utility to him, as compared with other forms of
consumption that would not be deprecated on account of their wasteful
ness.44
.

Veblen, like Frank, wants to avoid paternalism, so he allows the indi
vidual's decision to be dispositive of his own self-interest. But Veblen
goes far further than Frank ever does, because he does not confine
himself to Paretian outcomes. Veblen goes back to the use of the
"term 'waste' in the language of everyday life" and explains the reason
it "implies deprecation of what is characterized as wasteful":

In order to meet with unqualified approval, any economic fact must ap
prove itself under the test of impersonal usefulness - usefulness as seen
from the point of view of the generically human. Relative or competitive
advantage of one individual in comparison with another does not satisfy
the economic conscience, and therefore competitive expenditure has not
the approval of this conscience.45
In one fell swoop, Veblen goes where Frank fears to tread: he gives us
a reason to curb "luxury fever," which he calls "competitive
expenditure," not by a necessarily "simple and painless" "win-win"
means, but so as to satisfy the dictates of an "economic conscience."

42. VEBLEN, supra note 9, at 97-101. I discuss the concept of waste in Edward J.
McCaffery, Must We Have the Right to Waste?, in NEW EsSAYS IN TIIE LEGAL AND
POLffiCAL THEORY OF PROPERTY (Steven Munzer ed., forthcoming 2000).
43. VEBLEN, supra note 9, at 96.
44. Id. at 97-98.
45. Id. at 98.
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This collective sensibility is grounded in objective, interpersonal
values, and located in the domain of ordinary language and moral
sentiment. Veblen is thus somewhere between the third and fourth
arguments above; the conspicuous expenditures of the rich are bad
from an impartial spectator's point of view, whether that point of view
is a classical utility-based one (as in argument 3) or a moral, social
contractarian one (as in argument 4). A similar structure of argument,
including the discussion of popular morality, is still present at the time
of Tibor Scitovsky's 1976 classic, The Joyless Economy: An Inquiry
into Human Satisfaction and Consumer Dissatisfaction, another
important
(and relatively neglected)
precursor
to
Frank's
contemporary effort. These old arguments continue to have fresh
force. Frank deserves credit for developing and pressing the clever
second argument for a "win-win" change, but, ultimately, he might be
wrong to put too much weight on it.46
Frank certainly emerges from a close reading of Luxury Fever as a
good and decent man. We learn along the way that he had served
time in the Peace Corps with his wife of long standing. He loves
Ithaca's college community. He thinks twice about owning really nice
cars - he did not buy a well-priced Porsche when he had the chance
in the 1980s, although he now drives a BMW (pp. 168-69, 203). (Frank
also concedes late in the day that he now also has a gas range with two
15,000 Btu burners - which he considers "the signature emblem of
1990s superfluity" - but he takes some comfort in noting that he does
not have four such burners, as some fellow Ithacans have (p. 266).)
He cares about his children and their education, and is respectful to
wards his wife. Most importantly for the present purposes, of course,
Frank has dedicated much of his considerable intellectual gifts to try
ing to understand what might be wrong with an economic structure advanced liberal market capitalism - that all too many people are
simply celebrating as ideal. In Luxury Fever and in his other works he
has crossed disciplines and written with sensitivity and grace about
how to make the world a better, happier place.
But must Frank defend his rich ideas in the often impoverished
language of subjective welfarism? Perhaps ordinal utilitarianism has
become the lingua franca of normative social theory today, but that
does not mean it is right - and that we all must end up arguing over
the facts of the matter instead of their basic social justice.47 The sec
ond time I found the word "moral" in Luxury Fever came very late in
the day, when Frank writes about a public employment program. He

46. See Cass R. Sunstein, Vanity Fair, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 29, 1999, at 13 (re
viewing LUXURY FEVER) ("[Frank's] argument is both . . . plausible and ingenious . . . but I
am not sure Frank is right.").
47. See id. (questioning Frank's facts).
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thinks that this program would be a good place to spend the savings
from a progressive consumption tax:
Completely apart from our moral responsibility to provide the best pos
sible opportunities to our neediest families, a well-implemented public
service employment program would deliver high value for our dollars.
Notwithstanding the prospect that federal welfare-reform legislation will
reduce the number of people in our inner cities who are officially eligible
for support from the government, these bleak environments will continue
to produce large numbers who are ill-equipped to make it on their own.
And the fact that they may not be eligible for welfare payments does not
mean that they will cease to be costly to society. [p. 263]

This is what saddens me. Once again Frank feels compelled to argue
"completely apart from moral responsibility." Those of us who strive
to generate normative legal scholarship are being told, with ever in
creasing if ever more puzzling force, that moral theory must be ban
ished from our tool kit, replaced by something more avowedly conse
quentialist and "pragmatic" - namely subjective welfare.48 But is it
really the case that the fact vel non of our - of a decent society's, that
is - obligation to the less fortunate is a narrowly empirical matter?
That we must demonstrate that the gains to the poor somehow out
weigh the "losses" to the rich - that the "net balance of social well
being" has increased - in the spirit of the third argument, above, in
order to advocate basic decency? Or, worse, must we show that there
is in fact no loss at all to the rich, in the spirit of the second argument?
That our "pragmatic self-interest" alone justifies all change? That our
money is being well spent on our own terms - we are getting a good
"bang for our buck," as the awful saying goes? Is this what we have
come to? And what will happen if the trend of our times continues,
and we cut more and more the official "support from the govern
ment," so that the argument from backwards induction - we will have
to pay more for them later, so we might as well educate them now 
fails, as an accounting matter?
If this is where we have come, despair might be appropriate. Con
sider Rawls's recent plaintive cry in response to the voices of a more
self-interested and amoral political theory: "If a reasonably just soci
ety that subordinates power to its aims is not possible and people are
largely amoral, if not incurably cynical and self-centered, one might
ask with Kant whether it is worthwhile for human beings to live on the
earth?"49 Surely we can do better than to be better peacocks.
One ought to pause before prescribing in the name of a largely
amoral humanity. Frank does not. What passes for morality in
Luxury Fever gets wrapped up in Frank's discussion of "social norms"
48. See, e.g., POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 27; Kaplow & Shavell, Redistributing
Income, supra note 27.
49. RAWLS, PoLmCAL LIBERALISM, supra note 17, at !xii.
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(pp. 201-03). This is an amorphous idea that has entered into the
nonnative lexicon of legal theory of late.50 A large part of its role
seems to be to supplant anything approaching the autonomous
exercise of moral reasoning. Social norms just are, in the standard
view - though more often than not, the project of the "social norms"
school is to show how such norms represent a spontaneously
generated private ordering that tends towards efficiency, in the
specific sense of wealth-maximization. The nonnative theorist in any
event is relegated to a passive acceptance of such norms. Worse, in
their mere existence, the role of social norms is fully heteronomous individual actors are constrained to accept them, there is no reasoned
discourse, no wide or narrow or indeed any reflective equilibrium at
all.
It is in some sense astonishing - or ought to be - that Frank, an
economist and social scientist, seems "simply" to accept social norms
in his personal as in his professional life. Frank tells us that social
norms - and social norms alone - prevented him from buying that
bargain-priced Porsche in the 1980s: " [a]t that time, a red Porsche
convertible really would have been seen as an in-your-face car in a
community like ours" (p. 108). He still has doubts and regrets over
this fateful decision:

I still wonder whether I made the right decision. In the years since this
episode, a number of other Porsches have materialized here, and seeing
them always kindles a twinge of regret. But what is not in question is
that, at the time, there would have been a social price to pay had I
bought it. [pp. 168-69]
Fortunately enough (?), times and mores have changed a bit in Ithaca.
Frank now has a BMW (p. 203), and seems to think that if he could do
it all over again today, he would in fact buy the Porsche.
Perhaps worst of all, Frank doesn't even like the role of social
norms in combating luxury fever, in part because they are too frail, but
also because they are too "coercive" (p. 203). Heteronomy turns out
to be a drag - it makes it hard to buy even bargain-basement
Porsches. Better to put the tax system in place, so that we can all have
"luxury without apology." Free at last?
To be fair, I agree that we should have a fairly steep progressive
consumption tax, in part because we cannot place excessive moral de
mands on our wealthy citizens. It is in some sense hard to be rich; too
much money can be a distraction and a constant source of temptation,

50. See, e.g., ROBERT c. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS
SETILE DISPUTES 123-26 (1991); Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social
Norms, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 537 (1998) (symposium issue on Social Norms, Social Meaning,
and the Economic Analysis of Law); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development and
Negotiation ofNorms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997); Randal C. Picker, Simple Games in a
Complex World: A Generative Approach to the Adoption ofNorms, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1225
(1997); Cass R. Sunstein, SocialNorms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996).
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and the opportunities for doing good with money are complex. A
progressive consumption tax sets up an institutionalized social struc
ture in which individual wealthy capitalists are obliged to help, and are
given a choice of how to do so - continue to save and invest, helping
all through perpetuating the common capital stock, or spend on one's
own wants but cut a large check to the collective for the privilege of
doing so. The system sensitively takes into account human nature in
this way. But there is no reason we have to refrain, as Frank does,
from invoking the objective moral dimensions of such a tax - why we
must argue that this is a "win-win" deal even for "incurably cynical
and self-centered" people. After all, excessive spending on noncon
spicuous private consumption can well be a moral harm - and it
would be just as affected by Frank's steeply progressive consumption
tax. Yet Frank cannot argue, by definition, that such spending is an
arms-race type problem that cannot make its individual producers
happy.
Fortunately, the facts of the matter do not point us down the
gloomy Darwinian path. As a strictly empirical matter - and this I
think is important, for lots of reasons - not all the rich have luxury
fever. In fact, most don't. This is the central point of the widely
popular The Millionaire Next Door, and it is backed up by more schol
arly research.51 Wealthy savers are not imposing social harms in any
obvious way - saving is one of the activities that a reasonably just so
ciety should want its most productive citizens to do, at least as long as
there are some constraints on the private use of capital to unjustly af
fect politics or markets.52 Rawls writes of "frugal capitalists as op
posed to the spendthrift aristocrats," the former being those who up
hold their "natural duties to society."53
The problem with
contemporary tax policy is that it is backwards: it currently punishes
the thrifty millionaire-next-door types, and thus relatively rewards the
spendthrift with luxury fever.54 A progressive consumption tax re
verses course; it falls on spenders, not savers. This seems like the fair
and just, as well as sensible, result, in large part because social struc
tures do shape character and choice of lifestyle. One can come out
rather close to Frank on the details, in other words, without ignoring
the "moral dimension."

51. See STANLEY & DANKO, supra note 33, at 27-69; see also LAURENCE J. KOTLJKOFF,
WHAT DETERMINES SAVINGS? (1989); McCaffery, Hybrid, supra note 3, at 1187-88 and
notes (citing sources).
52. This point - that a consistent progressive consumption tax can regulate the use of
nominally private capital - I have consistently made in my work. See McCaffery, Being the
Best, supra note 35, at 632-33; McCaffery, Uneasy Case, supra note 3, at 353-56.
53. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 17, at 299, 537.
54. See McCaffery, Real Tax Reform, supra note 3, at 47.
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Frank's insights about the tendency, at least, towards excessive
conspicuous consumption are still critically important, but not because
we all, inevitably, have the fever. Rather we can understand life in
advanced wealthy capitalist societies as a constant battle between the
thrifty and the nonthrifty, those that have the fever and the million
aires next door. There is even a risk that luxury fever is getting worse,
although Frank is largely anecdotal on this differential point. Pre
cisely because lifestyles are variables that the social structure affects
- precisely, that is, because we are not "incurably" cynical and self
interested - our tax policy ought to get it right. We make choices.
Frank even acknowledges - in passing - that we might be free: "I
do not mean to suggest that we are not creatures of free will on some
meaningful interpretation of the term" (p. 176). Social norms come
from somewhere. There can be better or worse norms, more or less
followed. The law can or cannot support these better ones: the law is
inevitably moral.55 This is especially so in an area as pervasive, large,
and coercive as tax.
As Machiavelli wrote, "hunger and poverty make men industrious,
[but] laws make them good."56 If we drop the attempt to appeal to the
"better angels of our nature"57 in the law, we can do no better than to
become happy peacocks. Let's hope we can aim higher, and in this at
tempt to make us as good as we can be, moral theory - of the old
fashioned Kantian sort - deserves a seat at the table.
VI. A CHALLENGE FOR POLIDCAL LIBERALISM
Before closing, I want to make a few comments on how a nonutili
tarian, social contractarian approach to the problem of luxury fever and to tax policy - might play out.
Frank is clearly writing right in the grip of something that Rawls is
very much concerned with: the social bases of self-respect, among
other matters of moral psychology and social justice. But Frank's
mechanistic, materialistic analysis and conception of human nature sits
uneasily, if at all, with the very reason for Rawls's social contractarian
project - the working out of a Kantian conception of people as free
and equal moral beings.58 Frank's picture of human beings also seems
too limited to be a global description of our species, although it cer
tainly captures some aspects that at least some of us have at least some

55. This point I make in Edward J. McCaffery, Ronald Dworkin Inside Out, 85 CAL. L.
REV. 1043 (1997).
56. NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE AND THE DISCOURSES 118 (Luigi Ricci,
Random House ed., 1950).
57. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, reprinted in SPEECHES AND WRITINGS,
1859-1865, at 224 (Library of America ed., 1989).
58. See Rawls, supra note 26.
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of the time. Frank's depiction of luxury fever and its root causes
should add to our understanding of our complex and frail human na
tures. But it is simply not a matter of irresistible biological impulse
that people who have a lot of wealth must show it; this is a contextual
matter, and one that affects social justice.
Why then, has moral theory been banished from the social doctor's
medicine bag? Why can't Frank just come out and say that something
is indeed wrong with individuals' owning $2.7 million watches? Now
taking myself to be a moral theorist,59 maybe it is partly our fault. Af
ter all, philosophy has been credited with killing god, embracing plu
ralism, and letting the pragmatic genie out of the bottle. The once re
gal discipline has of late flaunted its skepticism and tried to rebuild
itself on the basis of evolutionary biology or rational choice social the
ory.00 Why should a social scientist look to moral theory, when moral
theory itself has been running for help to the social sciences?
A related dimension of the same problem - the seeming inhospi
tality of moral theory to normative social scientists like Frank - re
lates to the role of religion. The critics of luxury fever in the past have
typically had God on their side. The ancient prophets fall into this
category, along with Luther and the Puritans, of course, and many
other religions condemn excessive luxury.61 Smith's condemnation of
luxuries came from within a distinct religion, Presbyterianism. Veblen
and Scitovsky, modern social scientists, stood outside any particular
religious tradition, but each evoked religious norms in understanding
the social regulation of consumption. Yet Frank, writing at the dawn
of a new millennium, with postmodernism and political correctness as
cendant, does not - and within the social norms of our times, cannot
- invoke particular religious precepts. With the moral case against
59. I think my credentials are pretty good. I majored in philosophy as an undergradu
ate, and have used philosophical perspectives in all of my work. See, e.g., McCaffery, Politi
cal Liberal Case, supra note 3; McCaffery, Tax's Empire, supra note 34; McCaffery, Ronald
Dworkin Inside Out, supra note 55.
60. In this admittedly scandalously quick summary, I am thinking of the varied works of
Nietzsche (on the death of god), Richard Rorty (on pragmatism), Bernard Williams (on
skepticism and the limits of philosophy), Allan Gibbard (on the use of evolutionary biology),
David Gauthier, Brian Skyrms, Greg Kavka and others (on rational choice social theory).
See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, TB:us SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA (R.J. Hollingdate trans., Penguin
ed. 1961) (1884); RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979);
BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY (1985); ALLAN GIBBARD,
WISE CHOICES, APT FEELINGS: A THEORY OF NORMATIVE JUDGMENT (1990); DAVID
GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT (reprint ed. 1987); BRIAN SKYRMS, EVOLUTION OF
THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1996); RATIONAL COMMITMENT AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: EsSAYS
FOR GREGORY KAVKA (Jules Coleman et al. eds., 1998). See generally HILARY PUTNAM,
RENEWING PHILOSOPHY (1992).
61. See, e.g., STEPHEN INNEs, CREATING THE COMMONWEALTH: THE ECONOMIC
CULTURE OF PURITAN NEW ENGLAND (1995); BARRY SHAIN, THE MYTII OF
INDIVIDUALISM: THE PROTESTANT ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLmCAL THOUGHT (1994);
MICHAEL WALZER, INTERPRETATION AND SOCIAL CRITICISM 81-91 (1985) (discussing
views of Old Testament prophet Amos against luxury, inter alia).
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conspicuous consumption linked so firmly to specific religious doc
trines and traditions, Frank is led to sweep the "moral dimension"
aside completely.
Rawls and his project of political liberalism both underscore the
problem and point the way out. On one hand, Rawls has embraced
the "fact of reasonable pluralism,"62 and has thus banished particular
religious - as all comprehensive moral doctrines - from the exercise
of "public reason" to be used in setting up a just social structure. On
the other hand, Rawls has never retreated from the view that political
and moral theory compel us to attempt to establish, maintain, and
support just social institutions. The central challenge for our times is
to find a way to argue for morally acceptable social structures in a way
that avoids moralism, in its perjorative sense - in a way that avoids
privileging and entrenching any narrow, particular moral doctrine.
Tax is tied up in all of this. One of the important insights to be
gained from Luxury Fever is the way in which the tax system affects
matters of justice, as I have been arguing throughout my work - tax
can be both a cause of social justice problems and a cure. The harms
of luxury fever both affect the social distribution of material resources
and go to the social bases of self respect, now identified by Rawls as
perhaps chief among the primary goods.63 As Frank well illustrates,
the tax system is uniquely situated to address luxury fever. Thus, so
cial contractarian theory - social justice generally - cannot ignore
the broad contours of the tax system on account of its impacts on the
basic structure of society and on the reasonable aspirations of its citi
zens. All this leads to one final question: Can political liberalism,
stripped of anything approaching a religious voice, speak to luxury fe
ver and its possible antidote via progressive taxation?
Of course it can. It is a critical mistake - to my mind, the worst
mistake one can make in reading Rawls's Political Liberalism - to
think that moral virtues have dropped out of the social contractarian
project. While remaining agnostic as to the internal contents of any
reasonable comprehensive religious or moral doctrine, Rawls
emphasizes time and again the importance of the political virtues,
chief among them the capacity to act out of a sense of justice.64 A
basic moral psychology and moral sense has always been central to
Rawls's work. It is featured in an early piece on "The Sense of
Justice," played a large role in A Theory of Justice, and persists in
Political Liberalism. The very reason to care about justice as fairness,
after all, is that we believe that we can do better than to be happy
peacocks.

62 See RAWLS, PoLmCAL LIBERALISM, supra note 17, passim.
63. See id.
64. See JOHN RAWLS, The Sense ofJustice, in COLLECIBD PAPERS 96 (Samuel Freeman
ed., 1999).
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This gets back to the question of Frank's diagnosis. Perhaps luxury
fever is bad for its own patients, and perhaps it is an arms race, the
solution to which will be a win-win for all, no matter how incurably
cynical and self-centered we might be. But these ought not to be the
primary reasons for curbing the fever. Social justice should be. The
excessive spending of the rich affects the allocation of resources,
making nonluxury goods more "dear," in Luther's epigraph; repre
sents a failure to save from the capitalist classes best able to do so;
lacks objective urgency, in T.M. Scanlon's (or Veblen's) sense;65 and
incites the kind of envy that Teddy Roosevelt noticed in another
opening epigraph. Social scientists tend to rule out envy, for counting
envy as a harm would disqualify many social changes from satisfying
the Pareto principle. Roosevelt's quotation suggests that maybe "we
of moderate means" are to be blamed, for we do the harm of envy and
hatred to ourselves. But why should we simply rule a natural human
feeling out of bounds in normative social theory? And why is it the
case that envy is always and everywhere a self-inflicted wound? In A
Theory ofJustice, Rawls writes sensitively and well about envy, distin
guishing between "excusable" envy and spite, linking envy to the so
cial bases of self respect, and considering the conditions for a "hostile
breakout of envy," importantly including within them the loss of a
sense of natural duties among the rich.66 If the wealthy are signaling
their power and obtaining additional benefits by owning million-dollar
watches and 45,000 square foot mansions, is it really improper for the
rest of us to complain?
If Frank's arguments add to the case against excessive luxury
spending, I am inclined to think more power to them. But note the
ways in which Frank and Rawls are directly opposite, and not just in
their concern with subjective versus objective values, third parties or
not. Frank's picture is one of an essentially unfree, biologically driven
human nature that must sometimes bind itself to the mast. It is be
cause we are slaves to our appetites and drives that we must give up
certain freedoms in the name of greater hedonistic pleasure. To
Rawls and Kant before him, we are first and foremost free and equal
moral beings. It is to protect and enhance our freedom and equality
that we must curtail those actions of some of us that limit the freedoms
and basic equalities of others of us. Holding fast to that vision of free
dom, autonomy, and morality may be more important in the end than
curing luxury fever. After all, ideas matter.

65. See VEBLEN, supra note 9; T.M. Scanlon, Preferences and Urgency, 72 J. PHIL. 655
(1975).
66. See RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 17, at 530-41.
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VIL THE END?
Robert Frank has written another good and important book. It
identifies a major problem facing contemporary America, and it ad
vances a smart, sensible solution to that problem. In bringing to a
wide general public a powerful set of arguments for a progressive con
sumption tax, Frank has done the world he lives in a good tum. I just
wish that Frank and others arguing this way could more comfortably
step outside the limited quasi-science of self-interested, subjective wel
farist theories to make objective moral claims, and that contemporary
moral and political philosophy would be more inviting to people of
such interests.
We are still born free, but we are still everywhere in chains.
Money is everywhere, and even our normative scholars have been se
duced by its luster. By giving us a "simple and painless" way to enjoy
"luxury without apology," I cannot believe that Frank has pointed the
way towards our ultimate human liberation. Maybe one day we can
step outside the grip of money and money's worth as a metric of our
deeper moral worth, and become free at last. For in the end, the path
of enlightenment may best lead to a future, not where no one buys or
wears a Patek Phillipe watch, but where none of the rest of us notice
those that do.

